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Abstract
Nine years after deregulation became policy in commercial 
radio broadcasting, a study of the effects of the provision in 
the deregulatory position the Federal Communications Ccmnission 
took in 1981 which eliminated any restrictions on the amount
of commercial time a station could air in a given hour was conducted 
on 13 radio stations in five Nebraska markets.
Because the logging requirements to which broadcasters had 
to adhere were eliminated with deregulation, the data in this 
survey was collected by tape recording, then analyzing by 195 
hours of actual radio broadcasts. Of the 13 stations surveyed 
during the peak hours of the day (drive times), the peak days 
of the week (Wednesday through Friday) and at different times 
of the year, two stations, both in small, non-ccmpetitive markets 
were found to have exceeded the previous limit of 18 minutes 
per hour.
The research found that the foundation of the marketplace
model, upon which deregulation is based, is potentially flawed 
when projected on those markets which are not served by multiple 
radio properties. Further, the research advocates the direct 
methodology of monitoring not only the effects of deregulation 
on overcommercialization, but on any monitoring research conducted 
on broadcast content because the researcher has much more control 
over the data collection process. Finally, the research is meant
to stimulate more study of the effects of deregulation, particularly 
on the pervasive medium of radio.
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Introduction
Economic regulation is imposed because of perceived flaws
in the operation of competition in a particular market.
(Gellhom and Pierce, 1982, p. 21)
For almost 50 years the nation's airwaves were regulated 
chiefly under the guidelines of a single instrument, the 
Communications Act of 1934, and the federal agency created by 
this act and mandated by Congress to insure compliance, the Federal 
Communications Commission. In April of 1981, a new era in radio 
broadcasting began, the age of deregulation.
It has been nine years since deregulation has been a fait 
accompli. Where is the industry today? In what was the most 
comprehensive change in regulatory authority of the radio broadcast 
industry since 1934, deregulation was to have changed the very 
nature of what the public was to expect from the licensees of 
the now more than 10,000 radio stations in existence in the United 
States. Has it? And more importantly, what mechanisms are in 
place to monitor the state of radio broadcasting and its obligations 
to serve the populace?
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Historical Perspective: 1912-1981
To understand the development of deregulation in the 
communications industry of the United States, it is essential 
to understand the history of regulation. Tunstall (1986) sets 
the stage for this discussion:
Deregulation is as many sided a phenomenon as regulation.
Since the Interstate Commerce Commission took on the 
regulation of the railroad natural monopoly in the 1880's, 
Congress has entrusted to a variety of federal agencies 
the regulation of various industries. The range of industries 
has been vast, and the dangers to be protected against have 
also been numerous, (p. 22)
The first attempt in the United States toward regulation 
of radio was The Act to Regulate Radio Communication, passed 
on August 13, 1912 (Davis, 1929). It was originally written 
to "encourage the development of the radiotelephone art" (as 
cited in Davis, 1929, p.48), and the licensing of stations fell 
to the Secretary of Ccmnerce. The Radio Act of 1912, as it is 
usually referred to, was the first domestic law for the general 
control of radio (Ginsburg, 1979, p. 10). This initial attempt 
at regulation of the radio led to chaos. Stations were signing 
on the air with little or no forethought and interference between 
stations was dramatic, with the net effect of the radio listener 
being bombarded with a cacophony of often indiscernible noise
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(e.g. see Davis, 1929, Fowler and Brenner, 1982, p. 213-214).
The Act was proven to be an ineffective way to deal with 
regulation as court decisions held that the Secretary of Conmerce 
had no power to limit power of stations, broadcast time or licenses 
themselves (e.g. United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation (1926); 
Hoover v. Intercity Radio Company (1923); and Chicago Tribune 
v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station (1926)) (Ginsburg, 1979, p.
10, and Davis, 1929, p. 32).
Finally, Congress deemed the 1912 statute inadequate for 
the growing industry, and determined the only way the situation 
could be dealt with was to limit the number of licenses, since 
the listening public could best be served with fewer stations 
and a minimum amount of interference (Davis, 1929).
The result of the efforts of Congress was An Act for the 
Regulation of Radio Communications and for Other Purposes, approved 
by the President of the United States on February 27, 1927.
This Radio Act of 1927 created the Federal Radio Commission, 
and empowered the Commission to classify radio stations, "prescribe 
the nature of service to be rendered by each class of licensed 
stations," and to assign "bands of frequency to the classes of 
radio stations and individual stations" as well as determine 
the power and times they could operate. Furthermore, they were 
to do so as "public convenience, interest or necessity requires"
(as cited in Davis, 1929; Kahn, 1984). This standard of public 
interest, convenience or necessity is a construct whose exact
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definition is vehemently debated to this day, and will be discussed 
later in this paper. At the time of the signing of the Act,
732 broadcast stations were in operation. The new regulations 
caused some 150 to surrender their licenses (Ginsburg, 1979).
As the United States entered the decade of the 1930's, a 
new era of regulation was about to begin. According to Tunstall 
(1986):
Regulation has also tended to ebb and flow, giving each 
decade its particular regulatory character. The 1930's, 
for instance, saw the setting up of regulatory agencies 
which reflected such New Deal concerns as stabilizing prices. 
The FCC, established in 1934, and other agencies 
of this era were given significant independence and rather 
vague terms of reference. (22)
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was created 
by The Communications Act of 1934 and was the product of an 
interdepartmental committee appointed by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to study electronic communication. The purpose of 
the Act was to regulate all "interstate and foreign communication 
by wire and radio" (Ginsburg, 1979, p. 11) and, just as the Radio 
Act of 1927 which it replaced, it was to provide for the 
"administrative allocation of the spectrum and licensure of would-be 
broadcast users" (Ginsburg, 1979, p. 36). Further, the FCC
was to ensure that licensees strictly adhered to rules and
X
regulations under threat of revocation or imposition of forfeiture
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of up to $20,000 (LeDuc, 1987).
LeDuc addresses the breadth of these regulations:
The FCC compelled each applicant seeking a broadcast license 
to establish not only its technical, legal, and financial 
qualifications to operate a station in the public interest, 
but also its commitment, as evidenced by its programming 
proposal, to serve specific local-audience needs that its 
community surveys had isolated and defined. (5)
LeDuc's analysis clearly shows how the 1934 Act embodied the 
standard of public "interest, convenience and necessity" first 
outlined in the Radio Act of 1927.
In real terms, the Acts of 1927 and 1934 were nearly the 
same, with terminology and minor administrative details the only 
changes of significance (especially Sections 316 and 325 covering 
the prohibition of lotteries and those who maintained studios 
for the development of programming to foreign stations which 
could be heard in the United States). While there were subsequent 
amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, it remained reasonably 
intact for nearly fifty years (Coase, 1959, and LeDuc, 1987).
Tunstall (1986) states that deregulation began in 
communications earlier than in the other industries:
It really began with the 1968 Supreme Court 1Carterfone1 
decision which permitted non-AT&T telephones and customer 
equipment to be connected to the AT&T system. And in 1969 
MCI won its original FCC permission to hook into the AT&T
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system. But despite these 1968-69 competitive beginnings, 
communications deregulation took well over a decade to arrive 
even partially. (24)
Deregulation of the radio broadcast industry began in earnest 
during the Carter administration. The Comiunications Subcommittee 
chaired by California House Democrat Lionel Van Deerlin, shortly 
after Carter was inaugurated, set out to, as Tunstall (1986) 
describes it, "comprehensively rewrite the charter Communications 
Act of 1934" (29). Further, after years of resisting deregulatory 
efforts, the FCC began "wholeheartedly pursuing deregulation" 
(Tunstall, 1986, p. 29).
In 1979, the FCC, then chaired by Commissioner Charles Ferris, 
issued "In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry 
and Proposed Rulemaking" (1979):
We are today initiating a proceeding looking toward the 
substantial deregulation of commercial broadcast radio.
The Commission is proposing rule and policy changes that 
would remove current requirement s in nontechnical areas 
including nonentertainment programming, ascertainment, and 
commercialization. This represents a clear departure from 
our present involvement in such matters and we therefore 
solicit comments on the proposed changes. (457)
Less than eighteen months later, the FCC, still under the 
chairmanship of Charles Ferris, adopted and released "In the 
Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order (Proceeding
Deregulation
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Terminated)" (1981), which opened:
Today, having received and analyzed the numerous comments, 
and having held panel discussions at which the questions 
raised by this proceeding were energetically debated, we 
are prepared to resolve the issues. We believe that our 
resolution of those issues assures that service in the public 
interest will continue without unnecessarily burdensome 
regulations of uniform applicability that fail to take into 
account local conditions, tastes or desires. (968-69)
In the "Report and Order", the FCC took action in four | q
principal subject areas: nonentertainment programming guidelines; 
ascertainments; canmercial guidelines; and program logs. What \
this meant was that broadcasters now only had a general obligation
to offer programming responsive to public issues and could focus
upon those issues of concern to their individual audiences rather ^
p
than to the community as a whole. Further, formal ascertainment ( 
guidelines were eliminated, and broadcasters could use any 
reasonable means they wished to determine issues facing their
audiences. Canmercial guidelines were eliminated. No longer  ^
was there an eighteen-minute-per-hour maximum on the total number 
of commercial minutes; this was now to be determined by the 
marketplace. Finally, programming logging requirements were 
eliminated. Stations now were required to keep only an annual 
listing of five to ten issues (and examples of programs they 
aired to respond to those issues) covered by the licensee in
Deregulation
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their public file (971).
After 50 years of regulation predicated on the general 
standard of public "interest, convenience or necessity," a new 
era had dawned. Like much of the previously heavily regulated 
American industrial environment, radio broadcasting had entered 
the age of deregulation, or at least, reregulation.
Competing Models
Deregulation
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The literature concerning the deregulation of the broadcast 
industry is best characterized by the construct of two competing 
models or paradigms. The first is the public trusteeship model*1 
as conceived by the previously discussed Radio Act of 1927 and, 
ultimately, the Ccmmunications Act of 1934. The second is the 
marketplace model, embodied by the "Report and Order" in 1981, 
and upon which the current notion of deregulation was built.
To best analyze these competing paradigms it would be 
beneficial to break them down to those elements most contradictory. 
Bonder (1984) articulates two competing notions which will serve 
this review of literature most effectively:
Allocation through the licensing process and content regulation 
seems to have emerged from this analysis as two distinct 
spheres of broadcast regulation. As such they are more 
often than not thought of as separate, independent variables 
within the broadcasting regulatory framework, with regulatory 
determinations as to one having but marginal implications 
for appropriate regulatory determinations as to the other. 
(27-28)
It is the intent of the following to detail the arguments by 
each school of thought in relation to these "two distinct spheres 
of broadcast regulation," and to assess whether they can truly 
be considered independently.
Deregulation
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In what became a judicial review of the regulatory authority 
of the FCC, the National Broadcasting Company v. the United 
States (1943)/ Justice Frankfurter stated:
The facilities of radio are not large enough to accommodate 
all who wish to use them. Methods must be devised for choosing 
from among the many who apply. And since Congress itself 
could not do this, it committed the task to the Commission!.!
The Commission was, however, not left at large in performing 
this duty. The touchstone provided by Congress was the 
"public interest, convenience or necessity" (as cited in 
Coase, 1959, p. 13).
The 1943 Supreme Court decision in N.B.C. v. the United States 
gave broad approval to "the licensing scheme, with its inquiries 
into program service" (Fowler and Brenner, 1982, p. 214). This 
decision complemented and further articulated a decision rendered 
by the Supreme Court three years earlier in FCC v. Pottsville 
Broadcasting Company (1940), in which the Court described the 
"public convenience, interest or necessity" standard as a "supple 
instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body 
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy"
(as cited in Fowler and Brenner, 1982, p. 214).
Congress, the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Supreme Court agreed on each of two notions: there was a need 
for selecting licensees due to the finite nature of the radio 
spectrum, and the "touchstone" was to be the public "interest,
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convenience or necessity." Again quoting Justice Frankfurter:
The facilities of radio are limited and therefore precious; 
they cannot be left to wasteful use without detriment to 
the public interest...Since the very inception of federal 
regulation of radio, comparative considerations as to the 
services to be rendered have governed the application of 
the standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity."
(as cited in Coase, 1959, p. 13)
Proponents of the marketplace model, however, attack the 
spectrum scarcity justification of the public trusteeship model 
on two fronts. First, they argue that all goods in a free market 
society are scarce, be it labor, raw materials or capital (e.g. 
Coase, 1959, and Fowler and Brenner, 1982). Fowler and Brenner 
(1982) elaborate:
In most sectors of the economy, the interplay of supply 
and demand regulates the distribution of goods. If a good 
becomes especially scarce, its price is bid up. Ideally 
the highest bidder will make the best use of the resource.
(221)
The second argument against spectrum scarcity deals with the 
rapid development of new and increasingly efficient technologies 
in communications. With the increased public and private 
utilization of such information sources as cable television and 
satellite communications, the marketplace of ideas and the public's 
choices of where to seek out information and entertainment have
Deregulation
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actually changed the nature of the concept of scarcity in the 
broadcast spectrum. Fowler and Brenner (1982) argue that scarcity 
is a relative concept:
Additional channels can be added without increasing the 
portion reserved for broadcast, by decreasing the bandwidth 
of each channel. Technology is an independent variable 
that makes scarcity a relative concept. (222)
Advocates of the public trusteeship model argue that this 
new attitude toward scarcity "collides with the technical, legal, 
and political grounds for maintaining previous FCC policy because 
it is designed to protect the public interest in the use of public 
property" (Smythe, 1982, p. 198). The notion^of the airwaves 
being owned by the public, and the public having the proper 
and legal right to expect those airwaves to be utilized by licensees 
dedicated to serving the "public convenience, interest or 
necessity," lies at the heart of the public trusteeship model. 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (Secretary during the initial 
Radio Act of 1912) opened the fourth radio conference in 1925 
with these thoughts:
The decision that the public, through the government, must 
retain the ownership of the channels through the air with 
just as zealous a care for open ccmpetition as we retain 
public ownership of our navigation channels has given freedom 
and development in service that would have otherwise been 
lost in public monopolies, (as cited in Smythe, 1982, p.
Deregulation
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198)
Content regulation is certainly the more emotional of the 
two competing notions in the debate over deregulation. Mark 
Fowler (1982) stated in an address before a 1981 meeting of the 
International Radio and Television Society that the most compelling 
reason to do away with the trusteeship model ccmes from the First 
Amendment to the Constitution:
As an agency of Congress the Federal Communications Commission 
too often has violated the spirit if not the letter of this
important part of our Constitution. Each time we at the
  .
Commission insinuate our judgment into the editorial decisions 
of broadcasters, each time we try to tally how fair a 
documentary has been, each time we review a renewal application 
for this percentage of news or that percentage of public 
affairs, each time we clock the number of advertising minutes 
a station carries, we trample upon the freedom that 
broadcasting is guaranteed by the First Amendment. (54)
Coase (1959) states that the role of the FCC is conparable 
to the following hypothetical: "The situation in the American 
broadcasting industry is not essentially different in character 
from that which would be found if a commission appointed by the 
federal government had the task of selecting those who were to 
be allowed to publish newspapers and periodicals in each city, 
town and village of the United States" (7). He further cites 
Robert Hutchins, chairman of the Conmission on Freedom of the
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Press, who used the term "press" to include "all means of 
communicating to the public news and opinions, emotions and beliefs, 
whether by newspapers, magazines, or books, by radio broadcasts, 
by television, or by films" (as cited in Coase, 1959, p. 7).
Coase also cites a seemingly contradictory view by the Court 
in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948):
We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and 
radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed 
by the First Amendment. (8)
In addition to the First Amendment question, and in response 
to public trusteeship advocates who question what content the 
public should expect from a free marketplace model, market advocates 
argue that the open marketplace of ideas is critical to an informed 
populous. Geller (1987) argues:
The electronic mass media can make a crucial contribution 
to informing the electorate on issues of public concern.
To achieve that goal, to enhance the marketplace of ideas, 
we rely on widespread competition...The underlying assumption 
of the First Amendment is that American people will receive 
as much information as possible from diverse and antagonistic 
sources, (ix)
Advocates of the public trusteeship model are just as 
passionate in their argumentation. There are two critical elements 
to which the public trusteeship proponents point. The first 
is that if left strictly to the marketplace, programming of public
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interest in such forms as news and public affairs will all but 
vanish. In an article published between the "Notice of Inquiry 
and Proposed Rulemaking" and the "Report and Order," Campbell 
(1980) questions the FCC's authority to deregulate. She states 
the F.C.C. has "latitude to determine policy so long as it complies 
with the mandate of the Communications Act" (243). Campbell 
states that deregulation (then proposed) violated the public 
interest standard of the Communications Act of 1934 in that there 
would be a reduction in public affairs programming, news, service 
to minorities, editorialization and a diversity in entertainment 
formats. Smythe (1982) concurs:
If this FCC Decision survives future challenges (from the 
courts and the public), it appears that the public which 
owns the radio frequencies will be deprived of protection 
of its rights to receive radio service necessary for its 
educational, social, cultural, and political welfare - rights 
won in struggles in the Congress, the regulatory agency, 
and the courts over more than half a century. (200)
The second front of this battle over content regulation 
is more sociopolitical in nature. Those who favor the public 
trusteeship model over that of the marketplace are concerned 
with putting the power of the communications industry in the 
hands of the powerful, affluent few. Ingber (1984) suggests 
that the marketplace of ideas model is as flawed as the 
laissez-faire economic model:
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Due to developed legal doctrine and the inevitable effects 
of socialization processes, mass communication technology, 
and unequal allocations of resources, ideas that support 
the entrenched power structure or ideology are most likely 
to gain acceptance within our current market. Conversely 
those ideas that threaten such structures or ideologies 
are largely ignored in the marketplace. (17)
While the differences mentioned between the competing models 
are quite distinct, it should be noted that there is one convergence 
of thought. While not overtly presented as a consensus, the 
manifestation of this middle ground is a recommendation by the 
marketplace model to examine the arena of public broadcasting 
to serve as a hedge against the possibility of insufficient public 
interest programming. Geller (1987) offers the following scenario: 
The marketplace can and does achieve much, but there can 
be serious deficiencies that governmental policy must recognize 
and take into account...if there is a market deficiency 
(such as children's programming which informs and educates) 
(clarification added), as is true today, the government 
should adequately support public television in order to 
make such programming available, (ix)
Fowler and Brenner (1982) recommend the maintenance of public 
radio and television through a spectrum fee:
A bolstered public broadcast system operating within a 
marketplace approach would inject a "best use" strategy
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for most frequencies while still accommodating the nonmarket 
considerations that gave rise to the reservation of spectrum 
initially. Commercial broadcasters would be absolutely 
free to pursue commercial objectives without the lingering 
trusteeship obligations. At the same time noncommercial 
broadcasters would have a clear mandate to provide services 
as alternatives to, not duplicates of, the programming 
available over commercial channels. (255)
Survey of Empirical Research
Deregulation
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The most outstanding characteristic of a review of pertinent 
empirical research in the area of deregulation is how conspicuous 
the absence of such research seems to be. Even as the Commission 
instituted the 1981 "Report and Order", it recognized the need 
for a monitoring of deregulation, and in Sec. 109 outlines the 
FCC's responsibilities:
The steps we are taking here in no way will reduce our 
responsibility, ability, and determination to provide a 
regulatory framework that assures radio broadcast programming 
in the public interest. We shall continue to be concerned 
that broadcasters be responsive to the public. (1011)
The Commission also noted the importance of the citizenry 
to help monitor the progress of deregulation:
We continue to encourage citizens to meet with their local 
broadcasters to discuss their concerns, but if they do not 
receive satisfaction, they should take the complaint or 
petition to deny routes. (1011)
Given all the above, the Commission wrote, "These long standing 
channels will allow the Commission to continue to monitor the 
performance of licensees, and indeed will better indicate the 
responsiveness of licensees than do fixed guidelines" (1011).
Those who favor the public trusteeship model often criticize 
deregulation in that with the elimination of such monitoring
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devices as the programming logs, the ability of the citizenry 
to watch its channels of communication is severely impaired 
(e.g. Campbell, 1980). Hagelin and Wimmer noted the increasing 
need to monitor deregulation in their 1986 article, "Broadcast 
Deregulation and the Administrative Responsibility to Monitor 
Policy Change: An Empirical Study of the Elimination of Logging 
Requirements." In doing their background research, the authors 
found, based upon a letter they received from James C. McKinney, 
Chief, Mass Media Bureau, that "in the five years since the 
implementation~-of-^deregulati©n--the>Xcmmissijon has not empirically 
studied the impact of radio deregulation, even though Congress 
has explicitly urged it to do so" (206).
Hagelin and Wimmer, in the first and one of the few empirical 
studies on the effects of deregulation, tested two hypotheses:
First, whether public participation in the Commission's 
processes, as measured by the number of petitions to deny 
filed, has decreased since the April 3, 1981, effective 
date of radio deregulation; and second, if public participation 
has decreased, whether the elimination of the program logging 
requirement by the radio deregulation rules has been a causal 
element in the decline in public participation. (246)
To test the first hypothesis the authors searched every petition 
to deny filed in the four years before, and the four years after 
the effective date of radio deregulation. The petitions were 
analyzed by date, ethnic diversity of the market and market size.
Deregulation
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To investigate the second hypothesis, the researchers gathered 
data frcm the FCC on complaints filed against stations, as well 
as interviewing citizen groups who regularly participated in 
proceedings before the Commission. The authors determined that 
since ccmplaints are not held up to the same rigors as petitions 
to deny in terms of factual evaluation of programming, they would 
serve as an accurate measurement of the public's satisfaction 
with the deregulated state of their markets; a measurement not 
affected by the elimination of program logs as petitions to deny 
are. The authors1 contention therefore, was that if complaints 
had increased after deregulation, yet petitions to deny had 
decreased, or stayed the same, "then the elimination of the logging 
requirement quite probably has contributed to a decrease in the 
Commission's processes ("processes" in this case being petitions 
to deny) (clarification added)" (247-248).
Hagelin and Wimmer found that the number of petitions to 
deny had decreased slightly since deregulation. Further, even 
though the decrease in petitions to deny had decreased only 
slightly, "the decline is striking when compared to the number 
of citizens' complaints filed with the Conmission during 
approximately the same time period" (256). The research showed 
an increase in complaints concerning racial, ethnic and religious 
stereotypes, inadequate programming for minority groups, as well 
as ccmplaints regarding programming in general and programming 
of specific stations. Based on these findings, the authors state
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that if petitions to deny are not hindered (by such actions as 
the elimination of logging requirements), "petitions and complaints 
would follow similar patterns. Because they do not, Hagelin 
and Wimmer posit:
The increase in the total volume of complaints coupled with 
a decrease in the volume of petitions to deny since 
deregulation implies that the public is not satisfied with  ^
the market, but is unable to express its dissatifaction (
through filing petitions to deny because of increased 
difficulties in the post-deregulation petitioning process.
One post-deregulation change in the petitioning process 
is the elimination of the program logging requirement. (256)
In his unpublished thesis, Radio Deregulation and the Public 
Interest in the Omaha Market, Hancock (1988) examined the compliance 
of radio station licensees in the Omaha, Nebraska market to the 
Commission1 s requirements as to the state of the public file.
Hancock defined compliance as "the presence in the public file 
of the required quarterly issues/programs lists along with the 
methodology used to determine which issues affected the community 
of license" (41).
Hancock found a range of ccmpliance among 14 stations he 
studied in the market, from total ccmpliance to non-compliance.
The author categorized his findings into three "levels": "Level ^
one" or total ccmpliance, where stations provided an issues/programs 
list and the methodology on how the list was determined; "level
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two," in which the stations "provided the required information 
but did not label it" (46), meaning that compliance had to be 
deduced; and finally, non-compliance, stations which "made no 
documented effort to ccmply with the public file requirements"
(46).
Hancock concluded that while the level of compliance was 
mixed, the public files actually provided little help in determining 
whether broadcasters were operating in the public interest (63-64). 
Further, he suggested that the public file should have a broader 
purpose:
A public file serves the public interest only if it encourages 
programming that informs the listeners of issues and problems 
that affect their community...The findings of the study 
revealed little about licensee efforts to broadcast in the 
public interest and less about the market the licensees 
were in. (68)
Hemenway (1986) discussed whether the amount of 
"non-entertainment" programming had changed since deregulation 
in his 1986 dissertation, Philadelphia Commercial Radio Before 
and After Deregulation: A Time-Series Case Study of 
Non-Entertainment Programming in the Nation's Fourth Market.
Hemenway utilized the Campbell and Stanley time-series design 
to conduct an a posteriori examination of programming on 23 
Philadelphia radio stations before and after deregulation.1 
To obtain pre-deregulation data, Hemenway relied on FCC station
Deregulation
23
license renewal applications. Due to the license renewal pattern 
of three years between applications, which was the procedure 
until deregulation, he collected data spanning twelve years (or 
four application periods). Post-deregulation data was gathered 
during a Spring 1985 market survey of the same stations whose 
pre-deregulation programming was reviewed.
An analysis was then conducted based on comparisons of 
pre-deregulation programming percentages provided by license 
renewal applications, to percentages calculated from the 1985 
market survey. Because the author defined "non-entertainment 
programming" as "all programs classified by individual radio 
stations broadcasting those programs as either news, public affairs 
or 'other non-entertainment programs'" (130-131), the percentage 
breakdowns followed those three categories.
In the final analysis of his research, Hemenway found:
Scheduled commerical radio non-entertainment programming 
in the Philadelphia market has changed in the wake of 
deregulation. Much of this change appears to have directly 
resulted from the freedom provided by deregulation's passage. 
(396)
The total amount of news and public service announcements in 
the market was found to have dropped significantly between 1981 
and 1985. However, the trend appears, according to Hemenway, 
to be significantly driven by station "formats." For example, 
the research indicates FM music stations are programming
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significantly lower levels of non-entertainment programming now 
than before deregulation (the average total non-entertainment 
programming level in 1985 was 17 percent below the FCC's previously 
established level for FM stations). At the same time, it was 
found that AM stations showed an increase in levels of public /
f  \^ f /
affairs programming, a trend Hemenway posits began in the 1970's 
as AM stations began seeing a deterioration of their audiences 
to typically music-driven FM stations.
The research points to the possiblity of a causal relationship 
between deregulation of radio broadcasting and the level of 
non-entertainment programming. However, one matter can be said 
to be apparent: the public has no evidence of whether or not 
its interests are being served by the radio broadcasters today.
Hemenway, in his concluding remarks, suggests that this indifference 
may, at least in part., have to do with attitudes toward the 
medium itself:
The dearth of radio research seems to have been lost on 
most of the scholarly community, who have turned their 
attention to the latest broadcast novelties— cable television, 
satellite transmission, and the like. It is not that radio 
has only recently fallen from favor, nor that this disfavor 
has been limited to those within the academic community.
One media critic has lamented, "The networks, national 
advertisers and, presumably, the public has eloped with 
a brazen but seductive hussy called television, and radio
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suddenly became an abandoned orphan." Radio, in general, 
as a thoroughly integrated yet overlooked institution in 
contemporary American life, merits much more of our attention. 
Non-entertainment programming in particular demands the 
attention of all within the radio industry responsible 
for managing the use of a trusted public resource. (405)
S tat orient of Purpose
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In view of the concern expressed about deregulation of the 
radio and television industries before and after it became reality, 
it was interesting to learn that so little research has been 
done to monitor broadcasters' usage of the electronic media.
As shown by the literature review, the Federal Communications 
Commission, even when prodded to do so by the Congress of the 
United States, has, for unexplained reasons, chosen not to take 
on this task. Further, the citizenry (including communications 
researchers), Called upon for support in this endeavor in the 
"Report and Order", has also chosen, for the most part, to do 
the same.
If, in fact, there were negative aspects to the deregulation 
of the radio broadcasting industry, and if the public were not 
being served, the Commission has said in its "Report and Order" 
that it would remedy the situation. As previously stated, one 
of the areas in which deregulation has made sweeping changes 
is the elimination of commercial guidelines. To date, no research 
has been reported in this area. This is especially significant 
in that the Commission intended citizen complaints to provide 
the basis for monitoring policy:
The Commission in general will not be concerned with isolated 
incidents of stations with high levels of commercialization. 
If, however, there tends to be a pattern of serious abuse
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among certain classes of stations, the Commission could 
revisit the area through an inquiry or rulemaking proceeding. 
(1011)
To this end, this paper will empirically address the following 
research question: Has deregulation precipitated an increase 
in the amount of advertising aired by radio stations?
Methodology
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In order to determine the current levels of advertising 
aired by commercial radio stations, it is necessary to obtain 
representative data directly. No public records exist. The 
Federal Communications Commission has no empirical data and radio 
station executives are not obligated to provide documentation.
The standard for maximum commercial material aired within 
any one hour of radio programming prior to deregulation was 18 
minutes. In defending the call for the elimination of commercial 
guidelines, the Commission, as well as the marketplace model 
advocates, stated that broadcasters were actually airing far 
less than the maximum prior to deregulation. Included in the 
documentation of the 1979 "Notice and Inquiry" was a sample of 
stations in large, medium and small markets taken from the composite 
week programming logs provided by stations in compliance with 
license renewal procedures; this documentation indicated that 
the average number of ccmmercial seconds per broadcast hour was 
below the 18 minute standard. Three of the tables from this 
study are included in the Appendix of this paper.
In contructing the experimental design of this research, 
it was useful to recall the Commission's plea in the 1981 "Report 
and Order," calling for public assistance in the monitoring of 
the airwaves to insure that broadcasters were not taking unfair 
advantage of the removal of maximum limits on commercialization:
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Citizens' ccmplaints will also provide the basis for monitoring 
commercialization policy. Although there will be some 
additional burden placed on citizens to undertake such 
monitoring, in fact highest levels of commercialization 
tend to occur during predictably peak hours and therefore 
the burden is not overwhelming. (1011)
The heaviest concentration of ccmmercial seconds per hour occurs, 
logically, during those hours when radio stations have the largest 
available audience. Traditionally, and supported by the data 
shown in the Appendix, morning drive time (6 a.m. to ILO a.m.) 
has the largest available audience and the highest percentage 
of commercials. Morning drive hours are then followed by afternoon 
drive (3 p.m. to 7 p.m.). Further, the days of the week which 
tend to carry the highest commercial loads are Wednesday through 
Friday, probably due to high advertiser demand. It follows, 
then, that if overcommercialization was to be found, the hours 
of 6 a.m. to 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. to 7 p.m., Wednesday through 
Friday should be monitored.
Market size was another variable considered. In the "Comments" 
section of the "Report and Order," the question of whether 
overcommercialization occurred more often in small markets, due 
to the fewer number of stations which typically exist in those 
markets, was raised (1103-1104). While the FCC statistics (as 
well as statistics gathered by the National Association of 
Broadcasters) tend to indicate that "in neither the small nor
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the large markets do the stations even ccme close to the 18 minute 
per hour (1080 second) guideline," commentators were not all 
in agreement (1103-1104). Given the marketplace model, however, 
where competition in a market tends to keep broacasters from 
taking advantage of the elimination of ccmmercial guidelines, 
it did seen reasonable that the size of the market, and the number 
of stations therein, should be considered in the experimental 
design.
Ratings (as measured by independent research companies) 
are critical to the success of broadcasters operating stations 
in markets where research is conducted. The Arbitron Ratings 
Company (a division of Control Data Corporation) is the largest 
and most widely used of all ratings services in radio. Advertisers 
use the information gathered and compiled by Arbitron to determine 
the cost-effectiveness of a schedule of commercial announcements 
on a given station in a given market. It seemed logical, then, 
that if overccmmercialization is an effect of deregulation, those 
stations with high audience levels, as reflected by rating service 
sources like Arbitron, should be considered in the design of 
research investigating overccmmercialization.
A station which offers its market and its potential advertisers 
the only means to reach a specialized audience may also be highly 
sought after by the advertising community, regardless of the 
size of its audience (i.e. ratings). For example, if a licensee 
has the only country music station in a market, that licensee
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may well be in an excellent postiiton to run as many commercials 
as can be sold because, regardless of the ratings, if an advertiser 
felt that a country audience was desirable, there would be only 
one place to reach that audience. Therefore, those stations 
which are format-exclusive to a market, even if their ratings 
are low, should be considered in research investigating 
overcommercialization.
The final independent variable which must be included in 
the design is the difference.between AM and FM radio stations.
One of the chief counterprogramming strategies employed by FM 
stations as they began competing with their AM competitors came 
in the form of strict limitations on commercial time availabilities. 
F'rom their inception, FM stations have aired fewer commercial 
announcements than AM stations. The 1981 "Report and Order" 
found:
The data for FM stations show an increasing trend of 
advertising time over the 1967-76 period. The level was 
still lower than for AM stations, however, and no instance 
was reported of an FM station exceeding the 18 minute 
guideline. (1103)
In summary then, the independent variables considered in 
determining those stations to be surveyed in this research were: 
the times of the day and days of the week (per the Cocrmission' s 
report that there exist "predictably peak hours" where the "highest 
levels of commercialization tend to occur"); the size of the
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market, in that smaller markets tend to have fewer stations, 
and therefore tend to have reduced competition; a station's audience 
size, as determined by Arbitron in those markets where rating 
research is conducted; a station's format, in that if a station 
is format-exclusive to a market, it would be surveyed even if 
that station fell below the aforementioned threshhold for ratings 
dominance; and finally, whether a station is AM or FM.
Five stations in the medium-sized market of Cmaha, Nebraska, 
were selected by the following criteria: The two highest rated 
FM stations, as determined by a one-year average of Arbitron 
Ratings Service surveys (a total of four surveys), and the two 
highest rated AM stations were selected for monitoring. Further, 
because there existed only one news-talk radio station in Omaha 
at the time of this study, this station was monitored even though 
its ratings were below the established criteria. Each of the 
stations was tape recorded during the following periods:
July 15 to August 31, 1989 
September 1 to October 15, 1989 
November 24 to December 25, 1989 
Each of the selected stations was taped sometime between the 
hours of 6 a.m. and 10 a.m., and 3 p.m. and 7 p.m., Wednesdays 
through Fridays. Each station was monitored a total of 15 hours 
during the course of the research, or a total of 75 hours for 
the Omaha market.
The same research was conducted in representative small
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markets in Nebraska. Utilizing the same selection criteria and 
during the same time periods and times of the year, stations 
in the following markets were monitored:
Lexington, Nebraska 
Lincoln, Nebraska 
Plattsmouth, Nebraska 
Nebraska City, Nebraska
Once the data were gathered, the total number of seconds 
per hour were tabulated by: station; format; whether the station 
was AM or FM; time of the day; day of the week; week of the year; 
market size; and market. Caimercial material was considered 
to be any announcement ten seconds or longer, and having a clearly 
identified sponsor. 2
Over 200 hours of radio content was tape recorded over the 
five months of data collection. From this, 195 usable hours, 
representing 13 stations in five markets, were played back and 
the total ccmmercial time as defined above was determined and 
tablulated. The integrity of the unit "hour" was determined 
by the top of the hour network newscast if the station utilized 
such, or a separate clock (synchronized to the NBC News Network) 
to insure consistency across all stations.
Omaha, Nebraska, is the largest city in the state with a 
population of 349,230 according to the 1989 Nebraska Statistical 
Handbook (26), and an Arbitron market rank of 70 (Arbitron, 1989, 
p. vii). Five of the 15 stations in Omaha were chosen for this
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research: KFAB-AM, the leading AM station in the market and overall 
ratings leader employing an adult contemporary (AC) format, with 
a heavy news and sports commitment; WOW-AM, the number two AM 
in Omaha, and the only country music station (other than its 
co-owned FM, with which it participates in a partial simulcast) ; 
KQKQ-FM, the number one EM in Omaha, with the market's only 
contemporary hit radio (CHR) format? KEZO-FM, the number two 
FM in the market, and the only station with an album oriented 
rock (AOR) format; and finally KKAR-AM, Omaha's only news-talk 
station.
Lincoln, Nebraska, is the second largest city in the state, 
but has a population of only 183,050 (Nebraska Department of 
Economic Development, 1989, p. 25), and an Arbitron rank of 168 
(Arbitron, 1989, p. vii). Lincoln has virtually the same number 
of stations as Cmaha (12), conceivably creating a tremendously 
competitive environment. Again, using the same criteria, five 
stations were selected to be surveyed: KFOR-AM, the leading AM 
station, with an AC format and strong news and sports programming; 
KLIN-AM, Lincoln's number two AM (although ranked tenth in the 
market overall), and while identifying themselves as a news station 
on the air, music was monitored during several of the surveyed 
hours; KFRX-FM, the market's top rated station programming a 
CHR format; KFMQ-FM, the number two FM in Lincoln with an AOR 
format; and finally, KZKX-FM, having the exclusive country format 
in Lincoln.
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Three stations were selected to represent the very small 
markets in the state: KRVN-AM, Lexington; KOTD-AM, Plattsmouth; 
and KNCY-AM, Nebraska City. Each of these markets is either 
a single station market, or one in which an FM station is 
co-owned and partially or fully simulcasts its AM programming. 
Further, each of these markets is under 7,000 in population 
(Nebraska Department of Economic Development, 1989, pp. 25-26), 
and none of them is surveyed by Arbitron. In terms of format, 
each of the stations tended to employ basically the same style 
of programming. Music, typically of mixture of country and AC, 
was kept to a minimum, and each had an emphasis on news (especially 
local), sports and information. Each of the stations was a major 
network affiliate, and all carried both network newscasts and 
network features.
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Results
The results of the study show that in the 150 hours surveyed 
in the two largest markets, Omaha and Lincoln, the commercial 
seconds all fell under the established limit of 1080 seconds 
(18 minutes) prior to deregulation. Data frcm the Omaha market 
are shown in Table 1, while Table 2 reflects the data gathered 
in Lincoln.
The findings in the 45 hours monitored in the three smaller, 
non-competitve markets show that two of the three stations surveyed 
did exceed the 1080 second per hour pre-deregulation standard; 
one of those stations did so only once, the other three times 
(or 20 percent of the hours studied). Results for the Lexington, 
Nebraska City, and Plattsraouth, Nebraska, markets are shown in 
Table 3.
The literature bemoans the fact that deregulation did away 
with critical documentation the public was said to have relied 
upon to monitor radio station licensees. Through the process 
of data gathering in this study, the reliance upon documentation 
supplied by radio licensees to the FCC— as was the practice prior 
to deregulation— canes into question. It is possible that this 
reliance may have been an ineffective methodology. It certainly 
seems so when considering monitoring carmercial material.
It was particularly interesting to observe the length of 
commercials in their individual units (in this case, the unit
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of a single ccmmercial message). Using a stopwatch which was 
calibrated to show one-hundredths of a second, few, if any, of 
the commercials came out to the "standard" lengths of 10, 30 
or 60 seconds, and it is not reasonable to expect than to do 
so. However, when monitoring the length of a "live" ccmmercial 
(one in which the announcer reads the copy live and often "ad 
libs"), the possibility of radio station personnel properly and 
accurately monitoring and reporting the actual length of commercials 
is highly suspect. It is worthwhile to note that in each case 
where a station exceeded the pre-deregulatory standard of 18 
minutes per hour, the radio station aired several live commercials, 
some of which were, by design, intended to run longer than a 
typical 30- or 60-second ccmmercial. These points are illustrated 
in the case of the Nebraska City station, which aired over 20 
minutes of ccmmercial material in one of the monitored hours.
During this hour, a local real estate agent literally read off 
his listings for six and a half minutes. At one point during 
the course of this ccmmercial, the agent indicated that this 
programming was scheduled for five minutes. During another hour, 
the station's ccmmercial material came very close to the 1080 
second previous standard, and included within that hour was a 
live commercial for an automobile dealership which ran over two 
minutes. It seems reasonable that these occurrences, should 
they have happened prior to deregulation, may have gone unnoticed 
if there was only the reliance only upon station documentation.
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With the direct approach of gathering data advocated here, these 
limitations are eliminated, and the researcher has the comfort 
of maximum control.
The findings from the Lexington market reflect the highest 
average commercial seconds per hour of any of the radio stations 
monitored, and the station which exceeded the previous 18 minute 
standard most often. Interestingly enough, even given the extremely 
high commercialization of the station (over 24 minutes of 
commercials in one of the monitored hours), it is possible the 
high commercial load would have gone unnoticed in the days before 
deregulation (when it would have been open to sanction).
During each of the hours the station exceeded 1080 seconds, a 
series of "auction" messages aired. The announcer would either 
read live copy about an auction in the area, or play a pre-recorded 
tape of information about an auction and play all of these auction 
messages back-to-back. One of these sessions went on for over 
nine minutes. 3 With all of the live copy involved, it would 
be difficult to prepare a commercial log which would accurately 
reflect the actual time involved to read all of this information.
In that the marketplace model is driven by free market 
competition, it seems important to note the fact that of the 
13 radio stations in the five Nebraska markets that were surveyed, 
the two stations which were found to have crossed the 
pre-deregulation standard of 18 minutes per hour were in small 
markets which had only one station (or at most, a partially
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simulcast, co-owned and operated FM station). This runs contrary 
to the findings of the FCC in the aforementioned studies taken 
from the composite logs which stations previously provided the 
Commission as part of the license renewal application process 
prior to deregulation.
The variable of a station's format is noteworthy in those 
markets in which the listener and advertiser have a choice. 
Consistent with the findings of the Commission, FM stations, 
regardless of their relative advantage in the ratings, continue 
to carry fewer commercial seconds than AM stations. Given the 
news and information emphasis most AM stations have, regardless 
of their music format (if the station airs any music at all), 
it should be noted that much of the information product is often 
generated by an outside source (e.g. a radio network). Therefore, 
the station is obligated to air those commercials the network 
carries. This is important in that news-talk stations tend to 
air more national ccmmercials, for which they are compensated 
at relatively low dollars (and sometimes not at all), tending 
to force up their total ccmmercial seconds. This is also mentioned 
because it would be fallacious to assume that, because one station 
is airing more commercials than another, that station is necessarily 
in a better financial position— even in the simple terms of revenue 
generation— than the other. Further, in the case of the two 
markets in Nebraska with news-talk formats present, those radio 
stations are format exclusive in their respective markets, and
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each seems to be outperforming— in terms of numbers of 
commercials— other stations with better ratings. This is a 
potential aberration in the marketplace model which is, by 
definition, driven by competition.
Another interesting finding in the study was the extent 
to which stations in each of the markets approached the previous 
standard, yet stopped just shy of it. When consulting the Tables, 
bear in mind any finding over 900 seconds is within three minutes 
of the pre-deregulatory limit, and any finding over 1000 is less 
than one and one-half minutes frcm exceeding that limit. Although 
any limitation on the number of minutes of ccmmercials stations 
are allowed to air per hour have been swept away, do licensees 
choose to adhere to this standard as a means of exhibiting good 
faith for such purposes as a level of comfort for license renewal? 
Do they perceive a threshhold of tolerance on the part of the 
listening audience? If the marketplace model is valid, ratings 
and competitive considerations are a simple answer, but what 
about those non-competitive situations such as the ones mentioned 
above?
Conclusion
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This study gathered data directly by tape recording 195 
actual broadcast hours of 15 Nebraska radio stations in five 
markets. Times of the day and days of the week were selected 
which were determined might logically be those "predictably peak 
hours" during which the highest commercialization would tend 
to occur as the FCC recommended in the 1981 "Report and Order."
Of those 195 hours played back, recorded and tabulated, only
four hours were found to have exceeded the pre-deregulation standard
of 18 minutes per hour of commercials.
At first glance, it appears the industry is doing a reasonable 
job of holding down overccmmercialization in these post-deregulatory 
times. There are, however, seme indications that suggest the 
possibility of a contrary conclusion.
The obvious limitation of this research is that one is unable 
to generalize the state of the effects of deregulation on radio 
commercialization by surveying representative markets in only 
one state. There are some patterns which may be helpful to further 
study of the effects of deregulation in the radio industry.
Of the three small and non-competitive markets studied during 
the course of this research, two exceeded at least once the old 
standard of 18 ccmmercial minutes per hour. The one small market 
station that did not exceed the previous threshhold and, in fact, 
did not even ccme close, was a market which exists, at least
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geographically, in the shadow of the state's largest market. 
Plattsmouth, Nebraska, is located approximately 25 miles south 
of the Omaha city limits, and most Omaha stations are easily 
picked up on AM and FM receivers. While the other two small 
markets receive distant signals, they are weaker signals and 
the locales are geographically much more remote than Plattsmouth. 
Therefore, it can be inferred by the results of this study that 
the possibility exists that radio stations in small, single-station 
markets may be in a good position to increase their ccmmercial 
loads with little chance of interference by a regulatory body 
or a threat to its license. While larger markets are subject 
to the same regulatory conditions, the competitive environment 
in which they operate may draw more attention to excessive 
commercialization. Only further research can infer anything 
more.
Therefore, what can be gained by this study is an awareness 
of the lack of research on the effects of deregulation, and a 
strong recommendation for further work in this area. Also, a 
methodology has been proposed for monitoring not only the effects 
upon commercialization, but on any of the four main areas affected 
by deregulation: nonentertainment programming guidelines; 
ascertainments; program logs; and commercialization. This 
methodology eliminates researchers' dependence on a questionable 
source for accurate information: the very entity the researcher 
is attempting to monitor, the broadcaster himself. By not depending
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on the source to provide information, the study's validity is 
raised by gathering the information firsthand.
Finally, radio is a tremendously pervasive medium. Its 
cost, ease of monitoring and unique program content make it a 
popular and often persuasive source of entertainment and 
information, especially with a younger audience. It therefore 
deserves the research community's attention.
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Footnotes
1 Hemenway1s a posteriori examination of radio station 
programming before and after deregulation utilized the time-series 
design developed by Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley in 1963:
The essence of the time-series design is the presence of 
a periodic measurement process on some group or individual 
and the introduction of an experimental change into this 
time series of measurements, the results of which are indicated 
by a discontinuity in the measurements recorded in the time 
series. It can be diagrammed thus:
0000X0000 
(as cited in Hemenway, 1986, p.114)
2 To ensure consistency across all stations monitored, 
public service announcements, station promotional messages of 
special programming or contests were not considered "commercials."
3 The station was contacted to ensure that the auction 
segments were paid commercial announcements rather than unpaid 
announcements offered for public service.
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Table 1
1989 Radio Monitor Report-Qmaha Market (FM Stations) 
Station: KQKQ-FM Station: KEZO-FM
Format: CHR Format: AOR
Arbitron rank: #1 FM Arbitron rank: #2 FM
Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds
1 PMD 505 1 PMD 386
1 PMD 532 1 AMD 572
1 AMD 531 1 AMD 671
2 AMD 544 2 AMD 552
2 AMD 608 2 AMD 505
2 AMD 628 2 AMD 603
2 AMD 640 2 AMD 569
2 PMD 507 2 AMD 578
2 PMD 687 2 PMD 618
3 AMD 562 3 AMD 582
3 AMD 533 3 AMD 685
3 AMD 539 3 PMD 549
3 AMD 567 3 AMD 653
3 PMD 500 3 AMD 565
3 AMD 571 3 AMD 672
average: 564 sec. average: 584 sec.
AMD=Morning drive (6-10am) PMD=Aftemoon drive (3-7pm) 
AOR=album oriented rock CHR=contemporary hit radio 
Week 1: Jul.-Aug. Week 2: Sept.-Oct. Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Table 2
1989 Radio Monitor Report-Qmaha Market (AM Stations)
Station: KFAB-AM Station: WOW-AM Station: KKAR-AM
Format: AC Format: Country Format: News-Talk
Arbitron rank: #1 AM Arbitron rank: #2 AM Arbitron rank: N/A* 
Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds
1 AMD 428
1 AMD 568
1 PMD 509
1 PMD 510
1 AMD 583
1 AMD 588
2 AMD 900
2 PMD 641
2 - AMD 843
2 AMD 613
2 AMD 659
3 PMD 674
3 PMD 828
3 AMD 744
3 AMD 611
1 AMD 770
1 AMD 612
1 PMD 931
1 PMD 726
2 PMD 784
2 PMD 588
2 PMD 708
2 AMD 828
2 AMD 745
3 PMD 837
3 PMD 634
3 AMD 635
3 AMD 688
3 AMD 768
3 PMD 425
1 AMD 834
1 AMD 863
1 PMD 830
1 PMD 832
1 AMD 500
1 AMD 597
2 AMD 589
2 PMD 668
2 PMD 843
2 PMD 738
2 AMD 580
3 AMD 1072
3 AMD 714
3 PMD 901
3 PMD 1077
average: 647 sec. average: 732 sec. average: 776 sec.
AMD=Morning drive (6-10am) PMD=Afternoon drive (3-7pm)
AC=adult contemporary *N/A=Arbitron rank falls below #2 
Week 1: Jul.-Aug. Week 2: Sept.-Oct. Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Table 3
1989 Radio Monitor Report-Lincoln Market (FM Stations)
Station: KFRX-FM Station: KFMQ-FM Station: KZKX-FM
Format: CHR Format: AOR Format: Country
Arbitron rank: #1 FM Arbitron rank: #2 FM Arbitron rank: N/A* 
Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds
1 AMD 559
1 AMD 646
1 PMD 444
1 PMD 501
1 AMD 590
1 AMD 625
2 PMD 541
2 AMD 657
2 AMD 525
2 PMD 500
3 AMD 599
3 AMD 600
3 PMD 480
3 AMD 596
3 AMD 601
1 AMD 307
1 AMD 492
1 PMD 710
1 PMD 215
1 AMD 517
1 AMD 510
2 AMD 590
2 AMD 421
2 PMD 401
2 AMD 557
2 PMD 596
3 AMD 678
3 AMD 662
3 AMD 626
3 PMD 867
average: 543 sec.
1 AMD 438
1 AMD 418
1 PMD 412
1 PMD 400
1 AMD 440
1 AMD 446
2 AMD 422
2 AMD 565
2 AMD 638
2 AMD 476
2 PMD 580
2 PMD 507
3 AMD 786
3 AMD 514
3 AMD 449
average: 564 sec. 
AMD=Morning drive (6-10am) 
AOR=album oriented rock 
Week 1: Jul.-Aug. Week 2:
average: 499 sec. 
PMD=Afternoon drive (3-7pm) 
CHR=contemporary hit radio
Week 3: Nov.-Dec.Sept.-Oct.
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Table 4
1989 Radio Monitor Report-Lincoln Market (AM Stations)
Station.: KFOR-AM Station: KLIN-AM
Format: AC Format: News
Arbitron rank: #1 AM Arbitron rank: #2 AM
Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds
1 AMD 862 1 AMD 594
1 AMD 904 1 AMD 533
1 PMD 777 1 PMD 510
1 PMD 780 2 AMD 710
1 PMD 725 2 AMD 597
2 AMD 932 2 PMD 430
2 AMD 827 2 PMD 668
2 PMD 832 2 PMD 566
2 PMD 831 2 PMD 536
3 AMD 894 3 AMD 871
3 AMD 856 3 AMD 510
3 PMD 857 3 PMD 794
3 PMD 904 3 PMD 613
3 AMD 857 3 AMD 526
3 PMD 858 3 PMD 819
average: 846 sec. average: 618 sec.
AMD=Morning drive (6-10am) PMI>=Afternoon drive (3-7pm)
AG=adult contemporary
Week 1: Jul. Aug. Week 2: Sept.-Oct. Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
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Table 5
1989 Radio Monitor Report-Small Nebraska Markets (Non-Arbitron) 
Station: KRVN-AM Station: KNCY-AM Station: KOTD-AM
Market: Lexington Market: Nebraska City Market: Plattsmouth
Format: AC Format: AC Format: AC
Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds Week Daypart Seconds
1 PMD 991 1 AMD 380 1 AMD 382
1 PMD 833 1 AMD 1211 1 AMD 271
1 AMD 1309 1 AMD 587 1 PMD 716
1 AMD 1018 1 AMD 278 1 PMD 102
1 AMD 1190 1 AMD 462 1 AMD 257
2 AMD 1457 1 AMD 290 1 AMD 285
2 AMD 1035 2 PMD 500 2 AMD 293
2 AMD 1052 2 AMD 1019 2 AMD 300
2 PMD 1052 2 AMD 577 2 AMD 302
2 PMD 940 2 AMD 296 2 PMD 196
2 PMD 1076 2 PMD 401 2 PMD 181
3 PMD 763 3 PMD 476 3 PMD 196
3 PMD 486 3 PMD 474 3 PMD 125
3 PMD 784 3 PMD 618 3 PMD 161
3 PMD 737 3 PMD 464 3 PMD 217
average: 981 sec. average: 536 sec. average: 240 sec. 
AMD=Morning drive (6-10am) PMD=Afternoon drive (3-7pm)
AC=adult contemporary 18 minutes=1080 seconds
Week 1: Jul.-Aug. Week 2: Sept.-Oct. Week 3: Nov.-Dec.
Appendix A
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572 Federal Communications Commission Reports
Table 14A: Average Number of Commercial Seconds per Broadcast 
Hour, Sample of Stations in Large, Medium, and Small Markets,
Georgia and Alabama
Hour
ending: Mon. Tues. Wed. Thur. Fri. Sat Sun.
1:00 am 70.9 95.5 36.8 137.3 135.4 17.5 6422:00 am 3.0 105.0 43.3 140.7 101.6 383 67.53:00 am 0.0 121.4 17.5 94.3 89.1 34.6 5854:00 am 0.0 89.5 27.5 87.7 782 286 67.55:00 am 9.0 722 39.2 126.6 95.5 188 5926 .*00 am 788 169.7 175.3 2382 1672 53.4 77.87:00 am 431.3 532.2 531.3 525.0 555.0 1862 107.1
8:00 am 529.9 600.5 675.1 726.6 735.0 251.7 14329:00 am 476.1 519.8 566.8 656.3 681.6 279.4 158.910:00 am 394.8 454.6 458.3 622.6 5442 285.5 168.711:00 am 356.5 3462 387.9 538.4 4662 2772 179.412:00 n 428.6 361.7 447.7 518.6 519.0 289.3 80.51:00 pm 404.7 391.5 491.6 555.5 5632 3380 216.7
2:00 pm 343.7 364.9 445.3 5702 5180 2981 25883:00 pm 376.3 329.7 425.1 562.6 514.0 274.3 261.84:00 pm 395.9 408.7 489.4 607.0 6383 254.1 25875:00 pm 441.9 4883 562.7 642.8 7089 314.1 245.16:00 pm 410.3 461.0 545.7 644.7 650.7 189.8 243.47:00 pm 3282. 373.6 391.7 582.5 550.4 133.9 2232
8:00 pm 229.5 267.9 344.4 537.1 4180 133.3 1452
9:00 pm 179.0 238.5 297.1 471.4 3552 231.9 198210:00 pm 163.6 290.8 254.0 324.5 340.0 1286 149.9
11:00 pm 145.0 191.5 205.5 279.0 289.4 121.5 129.712:00 pm 58.1 84.1 145.7 207.0 2280 602 87.7
Source: Composite Week Logs Provided by Stations w ith License Renewal 
Applications.
For each station, data were used for one day of the week.
The markets included in this sample are all the markets listed 
in Table 18.
73 F.C.C. 2d
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Deregulation of Radio 573
Table 14B: Average Number of Commercial Seconds per 
Broadcast  Hour, Sample of Stations in Large and 
Medium Sized Markets. Georgia and Alabama
Hour
Ending Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. F it Sat Sun.
1:00 am 69.0 95.5 33.0 142.1 135.5 20.4 6422:00 am 3.3 105.0 49.0 140.7 94.5 35.0 67.53:00 am 0.0 121.4 18.0 90.0 80.0 37.5 52.54:00 am 0.0 89.5 30.0 83.6 68.0 28.8 67.55:00 am 9.0 722 38.0 127.1 81.0 15.0 5926:00 am 71.8 205.2 138.0 206.0 142.1 47.3 21.57:00 am 380.2 550.8 538.6 520.9 566.0 150.0 72.98:00 am 461.7 6532 656.9 680.5 738.8 203.1 104.59:00 am 435.5 588.5 601.1 635.0 6752 277.5 121.810:00 am 3432 524.4 477.6 543.9 544.0 286.9 158211:00 am 296.7 400.8 388.4 479.1 467.0 250.0 157.612:00 n 381.9 390.0 433.7 4742 4952 256.7 109.61:00 pm 301.9 436.8 4582 476.8 506.0 3422 229.82:00 pm 333.7 401.8 447.6 490.5 464.8 323.9 237.93:00 pm 331.4 367.5 422.9 479.8 495.0 277.5 249.84:00 pm 394.5 490.8 521.1 557.7 634.0 271.4 267.95:00 pm 41L2 540.5 548.7 581.8 698.9 33L1 265.66:00 pm 389.8 508.5 518.4 565.8 6572 185.0 257.47:00 pm 369.4 413.5 404.7 5802 6192 157.3 23238:00 pm 227.5 275.5 366.3 503.1 498.6 168.8 150.69:00 pm 195.6 275.0 3012 464.7 3922 158.1 153.110:00 pm 180.6 314.6 2782 348.8 3542 1532 87.511:00 pm 123.8 2062 221.8 278.8 3232 124.6 81.612:00 pm 45.0 93.1 146.4 232.6 2625 70.0 61.3
Source: Composite week logs provided by stations with License Renewal 
Applications.
For each station, data were used for one day of the week.
The markets included in this sample are the first 14 markets 
listed in Table 18.
73 F.C.C. 2d
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574 Federal Communications Commission Reports
Table 14C: Average Number of Commercial Seconds Per 
Broadcast Hour, Sample of Stations in Medium 
Small Markets, Georgia and Alabama
Hour
Ending Mon. Tues. Wed. Thun. Fri. Sat. Sun.
1:00 am 90.0 462 70.0 135.0 0.0
2:00 am 0.0 - 15.0 140.0 180.0 0.0
3:00 am - - 15.0 155.0 180.0 0.0
4:00 am - - 15.0 145.0 180.0 0.0
5:00 am - - 45.0 120.0 240.0 0.0 m
6:00 am 90.0 63.0 250.0 3582 320.0 80.0 810.0
7:00 am 538.7 338.5 518.1 535.1 530.6 268.1 190.0
8:00 am 660.0 495.0 707.9 8392 7272 3482 235.0
9:00 am 5532 382.5 5012 7082 6942 2832 246.9
10:00 am 4932 315.0 4212 815.1 574.5 2822 198211:00 am 470.6 237.0 386.9 683.3 4632 33L7 231212:00 n 517.7 305.0 4742 626.9 5662 354.4 112
1:00 pm 601.0 SOLO 555.0 7472 678.5 ftggft 185.6
2:00 pm 3622 291.0 440.9 765.0 6092 240.6 284.4
3:00 pm 462.0 254.0 4292 727.4 552.0 2672 2872
4:00 pm 398.6 244.5 4292 7912 632.0 219.4 220.6
5:00 pm 5002 366.0 5892 819.9 710.8 280.0 20L7
6:00 pm 4532 366.0 597.6 5852 6362 200.0 210.07:00 pm 19L0 285.0 3682 690.0 4122 882 208.1
8:00 pm 240.0 250.0 306.9 500.0 238.9 562 60.0
9:00 pm 4622 170.7 287.0 5072 270.0 39L7 920.0
10:00 pm 2722 229.0 195.6 221.0 306.0 64.0 1080.0
11:00 pm 315.0 143.8 169.6 380.0 208.0 1112 900.0
12:00 pm 1622 55.0 1442 6L7 80.0 2B2 510.0
Source: Composite Week Logs provided by stations with License Renewal 
Applications.
For each station, data were used for one day of the week.
means no programming broadcast in those hours.
The markets included in this sample are all the markets listed 
in Table 18 with the exception o f the first 14 markets listed.
78 F.C.C. 2d
